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The links between international migration and economic develop-
ment of the low-income countries have recently come to attract a good 
deal of attention: in 2005 the Global Commission on International Mi-
gration (2005) came out with its report, much of which focused on de-
velopment implications for the low-income countries; the World Bank’s 
Global Economic Prospects 2006 was subtitled “Economic Implications 
of Remittances and Migration” (World Bank 2005); and in September 
2006 the High-Level Dialogue on International Migration and Develop-
ment took place at the General Assembly of the United Nations (UN).
Why is the migration-development nexus attracting so much atten-
tion now? Two key factors go a long way toward explaining the in-
creased interest. First, international migration continues to grow. Ac-
cording to UN estimates, the stock of persons living in a country in 
which they were not born expanded by 14 percent from 1990 to 2000. 
The breakup of the former Soviet Union and of Yugoslavia accounted 
for some of this absolute increase, as internal migrants were suddenly 
now counted as international migrants. Most of the rest of the growth 
in migration simply reflects world population growth. In fact, migrants 
in 2000 remained close to their 1970 portion of world population, at 
about 3 percent. But what has really attracted attention is the absolute 
expansion in levels of migration to the higher-income countries. By 
2000, almost 1 person in 10 in the developed regions was an interna-
tional migrant. The foreign-born population of the United States grew 
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by about 13 million during the 1990s, and the number of immigrant 
visas issued by the United States in that decade was similar to the num-
ber issued during the mass migrations from Europe in the first decades 
of the twentieth century. Indeed, immigration to both the United States 
and Canada has been on a long-term upward trend since the 1930s. But 
the national origins of those migrants are now quite different from those 
of earlier migrations to North America; European migrants have given 
way to new waves of Asian immigrants, and in the United States, Latin 
American migrants have also increased in importance. Meanwhile, Eu-
rope faced a flood of asylum seekers arriving during the 1990s. Some 
were fleeing from violence on Europe’s edges, such as in the former Yu-
goslavia, but others came from much farther afield. Recognition rates 
of these asylum seekers were low to begin with and fell as more came. 
Yet the mass influx, coupled with the fact that the migrants’ countries of 
origin had not been common sources of earlier migrants, provoked con-
siderable attention among the European Union (EU) countries, which 
had never seen themselves as countries of immigration. Indeed, the EU 
member states still do not possess any coherent or mutually consistent 
immigration policies.
Besides the increasing numbers of international migrants, the sec-
ond component that has attracted so much attention among researchers 
is the flow of remittances that is now being reported. The World Bank’s 
Global Economic Prospects 2006 reports that by 2004 remittances to 
the developing regions had grown to nearly US$160 billion (World 
Bank 2005). This was about 50 percent greater than all Official Devel-
opment Assistance.
The link between, on the one hand, this growing interest among re-
searchers, international agencies, and governments in international mi-
gration and, on the other, economic development in the lower-income 
countries of origin runs both ways: development at home shapes out-
ward migration, while the process of migration simultaneously affects 
development in a number of ways. The next section of this chapter turns 
first to the former link: the effects of development on outward migra-
tion. Most of the rest of the chapter then addresses various aspects of 
the latter link: the effect of migration upon development at home.
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THE CAUSES OF MIGRATION, AND THE EFFECTS OF 
DEVELOPMENT UPON MIGRATION PRESSURES
Migration outcomes (i.e., whether individuals are able to migrate) 
are a combination of the desire to emigrate and of constraints upon re-
alizing those desires. Various forms of entry controls in the destination 
countries represent one obvious form of constraint. Yet these controls 
are far from being the only determinant of migration outcomes. The 
desire to migrate from a particular country shapes the application rate 
for legal entry. Moreover, no country has controls that are absolutely 
effective. Despite the militarization of the U.S. borders, the former Im-
migration and Naturalization Service (INS) estimated that the number 
of irregular migrants in the United States doubled between 1990 and 
2000.1 Estimates of the number of irregular migrants in the EU range as 
high as 10 million. Similarly, even such countries as Saudi Arabia and 
Japan, which have much tighter controls, have significant numbers of 
foreigners who have overstayed their visas.
Virtually all of the assembled evidence indicates that the gap in 
earnings opportunities for migrants between their home country and 
their overseas destination is a significant and important factor in driv-
ing migration flows. Thus, economic development at home—provided 
that job creation and a tighter labor market accompany this economic 
expansion—serves to diminish emigration pressures.
A counterargument has become widely accepted and is featured in 
a number of major reports on international migration, namely the con-
cept of a migration hump. The idea is that at low income levels a rise 
in incomes serves to exacerbate emigration pressures, while at higher 
incomes a drop in income exacerbates emigration pressures. At least 
five hypotheses have been put forward as underlying the lower arm of a 
migration hump. They are enumerated as follows: 
 1)  Rising incomes result in more rapid population growth, and the 
resultant population pressures are the root cause of additional 
emigration. Using this hypothesis, Hatton and Williamson 
(2002) posit that it was lagged population growth from about 
two decades earlier that drove the mass emigrations from Eu-
rope in the last century rather than rising incomes per se. On 
the other hand, very few countries are now in a phase in which 
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population growth is still increasing with development, so this 
hypothesis is of less relevance today. 
 2)  Trade liberalization, undertaken in an attempt to accelerate de-
velopment, can result in temporary job loss, and some of those 
displaced may emigrate. 
 3) A similar claim has been made with respect to the broader 
structural transformations (especially the shift from agriculture 
to industry) that generally accompany economic expansion. 
Note, however, that both of these latter arguments maintain 
that it is labor market slack that drives emigration pressures, 
which is consistent with the view that gaps in earning opportu-
nities are a major causal factor in migration. 
 4)  Rising incomes at home may ease credit constraints that previ-
ously prevented would-be migrants from financing costly mi-
gration abroad. 
 5)  It has been suggested that the returns on remittances are higher 
in middle-income countries, making emigration and remit-
tance to these states financially more attractive. 
Although these hypotheses are all eminently reasonable, and al-
though the notion of a migration hump is now fairly universally ac-
cepted, there appears to be little or no systematic evidence to support 
this pattern; rather, evidence supports the contrary, that at lower income 
levels a rise in incomes serves to relieve emigration pressures, while at 
higher incomes a drop in income relieves emigration pressures.
This is illustrated in Figure 2.1, which shows net annual migration 
per thousand of population from 1995 to 2000 for 164 countries. (Nega-
tive outcomes reflect net out-migration.) The horizontal axis displays 
the natural logarithm of gross domestic product (GDP) per capita, mea-
sured in purchasing power parity U.S. dollar prices. The two superim-
posed lines are a simple linear regression line and a spline regression. 
The simple linear regression line indicates a significant positive asso-
ciation: lower-income countries tend to have higher rates of net emigra-
tion, and higher-income countries exhibit more net immigration. More 
importantly, the spline variant clearly shows that the lowest-income 
countries do not have very low rates of net out-migration, contrary to 
what a migration hump would suggest.
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Although most existing studies support the notion that emigration 
diminishes as income levels and earning opportunities at home improve, 
there is considerable noise around this association, as is clear in Figure 
2.1. Development is by no means the only factor affecting migration 
outcomes: geography is important, too. This is brought out in Figure 
2.2, which shows the percentages of each of the non-OECD countries’ 
populations present in the OECD member states as of 2000.2 First, it is 
apparent that there is a great deal of movement among the OECD mem-
ber countries themselves, very often to neighboring members. Beyond 
that, the high emigrations from the Caribbean and Central America 
to the United States are evident, as are the large migrations from the 
Maghreb, Eastern Europe, and parts of the Middle East to the EU. The 
countries with high migrations to the OECD nations from further away 
tend to be countries that have spawned large numbers of refugees, such 
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Figure 2.2  Non-OECD Country Populations Present in OECD Member States, 2000 (%)
SOURCE: Docquier and Marfouk (2005).
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as Somalia, Angola, and parts of Indochina, though there are exceptions 
(such as the Philippines).
In fact, geography seems to be even more important than income 
levels and earning opportunities in shaping the migration of low-skilled 
workers. Figure 2.3 is similar to Figure 2.2 but shows only the percent-
ages from each country of the adult populations in the OECD with nine 
years of education or less. Two aspects of the data in Figure 2.3 are of 
particular note. First, some of the OECD member countries are them-
selves major sources of low-skilled migrants in the OECD. Not surpris-
ingly, large numbers of low-skilled workers are present from Mexico 
and Turkey, both of which are OECD members. But other countries, 
such as those of southern Europe, are also key sources of low-skilled 
workers within the OECD. In fact, 32 percent of the low-skilled mi-
grants in OECD countries are from OECD members other than Mexi-
co and Turkey. The second aspect to note is that very few low-skilled 
workers gain access to OECD countries from countries that are distant 
from the OECD regions.
Yet this does not mean that countries whose populations are largely 
unskilled do not have significant out-migration. Indeed, as the map in 
Figure 2.4 shows, a number of countries in low-income regions ex-
hibit fairly high rates of net out-migration even though their stock of 
migrants in the OECD is not particularly large. This is a reflection of 
the importance of south-south migrations, which often form the domi-
nant option for low-skilled workers from the low-income countries. For 
instance, Figure 2.4 shows quite high rates of net emigration from In-
donesia, Burkina Faso, and Kazakhstan, though emigration rates from 
these countries to the OECD regions are relatively low. Meanwhile, 
some of the better-off countries within the developing regions, such as 
Malaysia and Gabon, underwent significant net immigration.
A major example of south-south movement has been the mass mi-
grations to the Persian Gulf from South and Southeast Asia as well as 
from some of the lower-income countries in the Middle East. Many ob-
servers thought this process was coming to an end with the decline in oil 
prices in the early 1980s, but in fact there was a resurgence during the 
1990s, involving a wider spectrum of source countries. But other, less 
well-known movements are important too: from Indonesia to Malaysia; 
from large parts of sub-Saharan Africa to South Africa, to Gabon, and to 
18   Lucas
Figure 2.3  Non-OECD Country Adult Populations Present in OECD Member States with Nine Years of Education 










ent   19
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other higher-income countries within the region; from Burma to Thai-
land; from Bangladesh to India; and many more. 
Economic development, geography, the incidence of violence, and 
many other factors help to shape these complex patterns of migration. 
But what are the effects of the migrations upon economic development 
at the migrants’ place of origin? What underlies the other half of the 
migration-development link?
THE EFFECTS OF MIGRATION UPON  
ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT
Simulations suggest that there are huge global income gains to be 
had even from a small expansion in international migration (Walmsley 
and Winters 2003; World Bank 2005). The key to these large gains is the 
increases in earnings available to migrants upon moving. Accordingly, 
the migrants themselves are the big winners. In practice, part of the 
gains to migrants are siphoned off by various middlemen. In particular, 
both legal and irregular migrations have become increasingly commer-
cialized, so that recruiters and smugglers now command a significant 
fraction of the rents to be had from migration. Indeed, the limited avail-
able evidence suggests that the lower the income of the migrant’s coun-
try of origin, the higher this rent extraction becomes (Lucas 2005, pp. 
275–288). Because the migrants have almost nothing to begin with, the 
large gains to be realized in these lower-income contexts give greater 
leverage to the middlemen.
It should be emphasized that the net gains to the migrants them-
selves are a form of economic development for the nationals of the 
country of origin, even if these income gains are not drawn from do-
mestic production. The effect of migration upon the incomes of those 
left at home is an important one, but the answer to the question of what 
kind of an effect it has is generally ambiguous. Although such elements 
as tighter labor markets at home and the gains resulting from remit-
tances sent by departed migrants may relieve the economic situation 
at home, the potential for effects such as brain drain to act in the op-
posite direction is very real. One should not expect a uniform answer to 
whether emigration helps or hurts those left behind.
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Remittances
Transfers of remittances from migrants may be divided into two 
types: those that pass through formal sector intermediaries, versus those 
that are transmitted through myriad money dealers in the informal bank-
ing network. The latter generally prove cheaper and faster. The official 
data on remittances, as reported by the International Monetary Fund 
(IMF), refer largely to formal remittances, though even these data are 
subject to substantial measurement error. Little systematic information 
exists on informal transfers, though for some low-income countries in-
formal receipts appear to be relatively large.
The effect of remittances upon people left at home has been the 
subject of considerable controversy and some confusion. Other things 
being equal, receipt of such transfers must raise the standard of living. 
But whether the combined effect of departure of the migrants and re-
ceipt of their remittances raises standards of living for those remaining 
at home is far less clear. Moreover, whether remittances are spent in 
such a way as to accelerate the rate of growth of home-country produc-
tion is also unclear. Indeed, it is common for researchers to complain 
that too little investment occurs out of remittances and even for officials 
to direct policy to encourage such investments. Such efforts are largely 
misdirected. Officials of the home country may well feel that too little 
is being invested in their nation’s economy, yet why the recipients of 
remittances should be singled out to undertake the additional invest-
ments remains unjustified. Remittances are a private form of income 
and should be subject to the same rights and privileges as other forms 
of private income. To be sure, artificial barriers to private investments 
should be dismantled, but this is true no matter whether these invest-
ments are financed out of remittances or otherwise.
The extent to which remittances serve to alleviate poverty in the 
home area depends upon the propensity of poor people to migrate, and, 
once they have migrated, upon their propensity to remit. In addition, the 
indirect effects on poverty alleviation are influenced by the multiplier 
effects of remittance spending and by any job creation that occurs as a 
result of additional investment coming from the inflow of remittances. 
Researchers have devoted most of their attention to remittances’ direct 
effect on alleviating poverty. The extent to which current remittances 
alleviate poverty through this direct effect seems to be sensitive to how 
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one defines the poverty level of families—whether by asset possession 
or current earnings—and to whether earnings are defined at the level 
they were at before or after the migrant left. Nonetheless there appears 
to be relatively uniform agreement that remittance inflows indeed do 
alleviate poverty, and in some instances this effect is estimated to be 
large.3 The poor do migrate, even internationally, though perhaps more 
so internally. The poor also do remit. However, in a number of regions 
the very poorest are left out of this cycle of international migration and 
remittance receipt.
There is also growing evidence that remittances serve as a key ele-
ment to ensure smoother consumption patterns for families in low-in-
come countries. Given the vagaries of farming, many families in devel-
oping regions see their incomes fluctuate substantially between good 
and bad years. Add to this such risks as the family’s main wage-earner 
getting ill or a natural disaster occurring, and prospects can be quite 
uncertain. A plausible response to these threats is to have some family 
members migrate to places where they will be unlikely to meet with the 
same misfortune. Then, if disaster does strike back home, the migrant 
can support those family members in trouble by remitting. Research has 
brought to light several examples of situations where helping to stem a 
crisis appears to be reflected in observed remittance patterns.4
Azam and Gubert (2002) note that one can generally expect moral 
hazard responses to the insurance provided by remittances. Specifically, 
families that receive remittances may well react by reducing their labor 
effort at home. This argument is supported by findings in the Kayes area 
in western Mali, where household survey data indicate that although 
families of migrants have greater agricultural assets, their crop produc-
tion is actually lower than that of nonmigrant families. Moreover, Azam 
and Gubert’s results illustrate that this pattern is not simply a result 
of a smaller number of family workers available at home following 
the departure of migrants, nor a reflection of families with lower pro-
ductivity tending to have members that migrate more. Certainly these 
findings are consistent with a growing body of literature demonstrating 
that, upon receipt of remittances, families enjoy part of the rise in living 
standards in the form of additional leisure.5
A second impact of remittances upon the labor market at home may 
also be noted. To the extent that remittances provide a sufficient amount 
of foreign exchange to support the exchange rate, they also make ex-
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porting more difficult. This effect, which is sometimes referred to as the 
“Dutch disease” effect of remittances, can serve to limit employment 
creation in the export sector, potentially leading to greater pressures to 
emigrate.6
Labor Market Impacts at Home
Apart from the effects of remittances through moral hazard in labor 
supply and through the exchange rate upon employment creation, the 
departure of migrant workers can readily affect the labor markets at 
home more directly. The withdrawal of migrants typically will either 
put pressure on home country wages to rise or will at least shorten the 
queue for jobs, depending upon whether or not the market has a labor 
surplus. More generally, migration’s overall impact on the home coun-
try’s labor market will also depend upon the extent of internal migration 
induced to replace departing workers and upon the skill mix of those 
migrating. A key element is whether the skills possessed by emigrants 
are complements or substitutes for the skills of those who remain at 
home. For example, the departure of highly skilled workers could raise 
the earnings of their direct competitors at home yet lower the demand 
for less-skilled workers who would have worked alongside those de-
parting migrants in ancillary positions (Davies and Wooton 1992).
Rather surprisingly, although the issue of immigration’s impacts on 
the labor market has been the subject of extensive research, the issue 
of emigration’s impacts upon labor markets in countries of origin re-
mains largely neglected. Certainly no generalizations appear possible 
at this juncture.7 Nonetheless, how the home country’s labor market 
performs for highly skilled persons proves central to determining how 
much damage is done by the brain drain.
Brain Drain, Brain Gain, and Brain Overhang
Figure 2.5 shows the percentage of each country’s tertiary educated 
population residing abroad in an OECD country in 2000.8 Although this 
percentage omits emigration of the highly skilled to non-OECD coun-
tries, on which no systematic data exist, Figure 2.5 nonetheless offers 
a good picture of the incidence of the brain drain flowing from devel-
oping to industrialized regions. Particularly high rates of brain drain 
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are observed from Central America and the Caribbean, Eastern Europe, 
parts of the Middle East and Indochina, and across almost the whole of 
Africa.
North America, and the United States in particular, is the princi-
pal destination for these highly skilled migrants. European firms have 
only recently joined the race to attract the highly skilled, and Europe’s 
foreign population is dominated by lower-skilled workers. Even the 
exodus of highly skilled professionals from Eastern Europe and the 
Commonwealth of Independent States (consisting of 11 former Soviet 
republics) occurred mostly to the United States during the 1990s, not to 
neighboring Western Europe.
Do the low-income countries lose from this departure of their most 
talented and highly educated? Chief among the potential sources of 
harm commonly cited are the following three types of loss: 1) the loss 
of economic growth, since such growth generally correlates with the 
presence of educated persons; 2) the loss of external benefits (such as 
better governance) that come with the presence of highly skilled com-
patriots; and 3) the loss of public funds invested in the highly skilled, 
as well as the loss of funds that would be taxed from their incomes at 
home. Each of these losses is controversial. Although the presence of 
highly skilled people is correlated with faster growth and with vari-
ous beneficial outcomes such as the aforementioned better governance, 
whether this presence is the causal factor remains in dispute. Moreover, 
if there are any benefits, the question of whether the highly educated 
themselves reap the lion’s share of these benefits in the form of higher 
incomes remains untested. And whether the highly educated make a 
net contribution to the fiscal balance is also contentious, since public 
spending on the highly educated and their families is often greater. On 
the other hand, the loss of public funds invested in the highly educated 
is much clearer in countries that heavily subsidize higher education of 
even the children of elite families.
A separate but closely related aspect of these potential losses is 
countries’ inability to deliver key social services, such as health care 
and education, without trained personnel. The mass recruiting of health 
care workers from Africa has attracted particular criticism in the face 
of the HIV/AIDS epidemic there, not to mention malaria and other dis-
eases that ravage the continent. Yet it is not clear that the emigration 
of doctors and nurses from Africa is the main constraint on the ability 
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of African states to offer better health care (Clemens 2006). Indeed, 
across the spectrum of professions and in all developing regions, the 
inefficient use and allocation of the highly skilled classes raise serious 
doubts about the real costs imposed by their departure—a feature that 
might be called “brain overhang.”
But many observers go even further, claiming that emigration of 
the highly skilled can confer benefits on their country of origin through 
the activities of a professional diaspora, which has become known as 
“brain gain.” The best documented of these arguments is that a diaspora 
may have a beneficial effect on promoting trade with the home country; 
it does this by its members improving the flow of information between 
the home and the destination countries and by their ability to enforce 
contracts (Rauch 2001). For example, it seems the presence of Indian IT 
professionals in this country was critical to expanding India’s software 
exports to the United States (Saxenian 2004). Other routes that can lead 
to beneficial effects and are commonly cited, but far less well docu-
mented, involve the transfer of technology and the promotion of direct 
investments in the home country.
However, the aspect of brain gain that has perhaps attracted the most 
attention recently is the inducement to expand education at home. The 
idea is that the emigration opportunity afforded by higher education 
induces greater college enrollments, and that only a fraction of those 
thus attracted to continue their education will actually manage to leave 
the country. If the stock of the highly educated population left at home 
thus expands, domestic production may then be improved (Mountford 
1997; Stark and Wang 2002). Some observers may express reservations 
about this: the expansion of home education is hardly costless, and the 
freshly attracted students may be less competent, for instance (Schiff 
2005). But perhaps more importantly, the evidence across countries 
does not seem to support this hypothesis, though certainly in some spe-
cific countries (such as the Philippines) enrollment in higher education 
indeed appears to be quite sensitive to overseas opportunities (Lucas 
2005, Box 4.1).
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SUMMING UP: POLICIES AND PROSPECTS
The effects of emigration upon economic development for those 
remaining at home are mixed. The effects are typically more poverty-
alleviating, and possibly more positive for development in general, in 
cases where migrants are drawn from the lower-skilled parts of the la-
bor force. It also tends to be true that the effects upon incomes of those 
remaining at home are more positive when the return rate (or at least 
the intended return rate) of migrants is higher. For instance, the massive 
remittances resulting from migration to the Persian Gulf are largely a 
reflection of the enforced family separation and the temporary nature of 
these movements.
Virtually none of the high-income countries really think of their 
migration policies as part of a more coherent development policy for 
the lower-income regions. Indeed, the competition among firms in the 
high-income countries to attract the best and the brightest from the de-
veloping regions is heating up: an ever-increasing number of industrial-
ized countries are actively recruiting foreign students, often with the 
express intent of keeping the most successful. Meanwhile, almost all of 
the high-income countries have in place massive agricultural subsidies 
and protect low-skilled manufacturing activities. Both agriculture and 
manufacturing employ irregular migrants from the developing regions. 
However, the low-skilled workers thus brought to the OECD coun-
tries tend to come from nearby nations that are not among the lowest-in-
come countries. In fact, the force of geography is such that the propen-
sity of countries to send their low-skilled workers to the OECD regions 
rises significantly with the income level of the originating country.
Temporary migrations of low-skilled workers probably have the 
biggest impact on poverty reduction in the developing regions of any 
type of migration. Most high-income countries seem to prefer tempo-
rary migrants to permanent ones and have expanded several of their 
temporary migration schemes. Yet such schemes face a fundamental 
dilemma: attempts to integrate migrants, to promote their rights, and 
to enable family reunification all tend to discourage return migration. 
On the other hand, the family and social costs can be high from gov-
ernment approaches to temporary migration that prevent legal family 
accompaniment.
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What we probably need to seek are better ways of managing such 
temporary migrations. Certainly a number of steps seem eminently fea-
sible to encourage greater return rates. Extending Mode 4 of the General 
Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS) to encompass low-skilled ser-
vices may be one such critical step.9 Establishing transferability of pen-
sion schemes to the home country is another. The use of intermediary 
contracting of projects appears to be particularly effective in ensuring 
that migrants return home, though such schemes need closer regulation 
to prevent abuse of the contract workers.10 Ironically, irregular migrants 
are discouraged from returning home when the prospect of recrossing 
the border becomes more formidable.
In practice, only a few developing countries actually have very high 
emigration rates to the industrialized nations. Distance deters migration, 
both internally and internationally (Lucas 2001). Social networks help 
to amplify migration streams, once initiated. The combined effect is 
that remote countries, and remote villages within countries, are left out 
of the migration process. Where migration is never initiated, the com-
munity becomes increasingly isolated from a growing migration flow, 
both internally and globally, and pockets of poverty remain there. Yet 
south-south migrations often present migration opportunities of shorter 
distance, and consequently in today’s setting they may represent the 
most important vehicles of poverty relief through migration from the 
lowest-income countries.
This picture could change. Communications, transportation, and 
commercialization of movement are all increasing. Moreover, the demo-
graphic map will shift dramatically over the coming decades. Most mi-
grants are young adults, typically ages 15–30. By far the fastest growing 
populations in this age range are in sub-Saharan Africa (Lucas 2006). 
The world may well witness a rapid Africanization of international mi-
gration in the next half century—not just within the African continent, 
which is the dominant pattern at present, but out of Africa too.
Notes
 1. On March 1, 2003, the INS was relocated from the Department of Justice to the 
Department of Homeland Security and split into three agencies: the Bureau of 
Citizenship and Immigration Services, the Bureau of Customs and Border Pro-
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tection, and the Bureau of Immigration and Customs Enforcement. “Irregular” 
migrants are undocumented or illegal migrants.
 2. The OECD, or Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, is com-
posed of 30 market democracies and is dedicated to helping governments tackle 
the economic, social, and governance challenges of a globalized economy.
 3. See, for example, Tingsabadh (1989) on Thailand, Gustafsson and Makonnen 
(1993) on migration of Lesotho’s mine workers to South Africa, Lachaud (1999) 
on Burkina Faso, Adams and Page (2003a) on North Africa, and Adams (2005) 
on Guatemala, plus Adams and Page (2003b) for more global evidence.
 4. See Lucas and Stark (1985) on Botswana, Hoddinott (1992, 1994) on western 
Kenya, Brown (1997) on Pacific Island migrants, Schrieder and Knerr (2000) on 
Cameroon, Gubert (2002) on the Kayes areas of western Mali, and Quartey and 
Blankson (2004) on Ghana.
 5.  See Funkhouser (1992) on Nicaragua, Rodriguez and Tiongson (2001) and Yang 
(2004) on the Philippines, and Amuedo-Dorantes and Pozo (2006) on Mexico.
 6. For an early discussion of this point, see Quibria (1997). The Economist coined 
the term “Dutch disease” in 1977 to describe the manufacturing sector’s de-
cline in the Netherlands after natural gas was discovered in the North Sea in 
the 1960s. Deindustrialization followed because the discovery of this natural 
resource raised the value of the Dutch guilder, making manufactured goods less 
competitive with those of other nations, thus increasing imports and decreasing 
exports.
 7.  For a review, see Lucas (2005, pp. 85–102).
 8.  See also Dumont and Lemaître (2004).
 9. In GATS, a treaty of the World Trade Organization, Mode 4 deals with the inter-
national movement of people in the process of delivering international trade in 
services.
 10. “Contracting” here refers to a firm taking on a project abroad and bringing work-
ers from abroad to execute this project.
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